In recent years, U.S. policy on semiconductor exports to China has shifted from broad restrictions toward more calibrated adjustments, driven by strategic considerations beyond mere technological competition. First, the U.S. aims to slow China’s advancement in critical domains—such as artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and military technologies—by restricting access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, thereby preserving its own technological supremacy. Second, sweeping export controls have significantly hurt American semiconductor firms like NVIDIA and Intel, whose revenues have declined due to lost Chinese market access, prompting Washington to balance national security concerns with commercial interests. Moreover, given the deeply integrated global supply chain, a complete decoupling is neither feasible nor economically rational. Consequently, the U.S. has adopted a ‘small yard, high fence’ approach—precisely targeting the most sensitive technologies while permitting trade in less advanced chips. Finally, this recalibration buys time for domestic initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act to boost U.S. chip manufacturing and for rallying allies into a technology alliance that excludes China. Overall, the evolving U.S. chip export policy reflects a complex calculus between containing China’s rise and safeguarding its own industrial and economic interests.
近年来，美国对华芯片出口政策经历了从全面限制到局部调整的转变，其深层逻辑并非单纯出于技术竞争，而是多重战略考量的综合体现。首先，美国试图通过限制高端芯片及制造设备出口，延缓中国在人工智能、超级计算和军事科技等关键领域的发展速度，以维持自身技术霸权。其次，过度限制已对美国本土半导体企业造成显著财务压力，如英伟达、英特尔等公司因失去中国市场而营收下滑，促使政府在国家安全与商业利益之间寻求平衡。此外，全球供应链高度互联，完全脱钩既不现实也不经济，因此美国转而采取‘小院高墙’策略——精准封锁最敏感技术，同时允许中低端芯片贸易继续进行。最后，此举也是为争取时间，加速本土芯片制造回流（如《芯片与科学法案》），并联合盟友构建排除中国的‘技术联盟’。总体而言，美国对华芯片政策的调整，反映了其在遏制中国崛起与维护自身产业利益之间的复杂权衡。
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