In response to ongoing U.S. sanctions and military pressure, Iran is likely to adopt a multi-layered, asymmetric strategy of retaliation. First, at the regional level, Iran may intensify attacks by its proxy groups—such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi militias—against U.S. forces and allied targets, using low-intensity conflict to wear down its adversaries. Second, Iran could disrupt maritime traffic or even attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global oil chokepoint, thereby threatening energy supplies and driving up oil prices to pressure Western economies. Additionally, Tehran might accelerate its nuclear program, exceeding the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by enriching uranium to higher levels and stockpiling greater quantities, thus enhancing its strategic deterrence. In cyberspace, Iran possesses notable cyber capabilities and could launch cyberattacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure or financial systems. Importantly, Iran generally seeks to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States, preferring instead ‘gray zone’ tactics—ambiguous actions that fall between peace and open war—to achieve its strategic objectives while preserving diplomatic flexibility. Overall, Iran’s retaliatory measures will likely emphasize cost-effectiveness, aiming to maximize pressure on the U.S. without triggering full-scale conflict.
面对美国持续的制裁与军事压力，伊朗可能采取多层次、非对称的反击策略。首先，在地区层面，伊朗或通过其支持的代理人组织（如黎巴嫩真主党、也门胡塞武装、伊拉克民兵等）加大对美军及其盟友目标的袭扰，以低强度冲突消耗对手。其次，伊朗可能在霍尔木兹海峡等关键航道实施海上封锁或干扰油轮通行，以此威胁全球能源供应，抬高国际油价，向西方施压。此外，伊朗还可能加速推进核计划，突破《联合全面行动计划》（JCPOA）限制，增加浓缩铀丰度和储量，以增强战略威慑力。在网络空间方面，伊朗具备一定网络战能力，可能对美国关键基础设施或金融系统发动网络攻击。值得注意的是，伊朗倾向于避免与美国直接军事对抗，更偏好通过“灰色地带”战术——即介于和平与战争之间的模糊行动——来实现战略目标，同时保留外交回旋余地。总体而言，伊朗的反击将注重成本效益比，力求在不引发全面战争的前提下，最大化对美施压效果。
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